This on-line version is the pre-copyedited, preprint version. The published version can be found here: 
‘State- and regulation-theoretical perspectives on the European Union and the failure of the Lisbon Agenda’, Competition and Change, 10 (2), 145-65, 2006.
This contribution adopts a dual state- and regulation-theoretical approach to analyze the European Union as an emerging political system and its role in capital accumulation. It does so in three respects. First, in state-theoretical terms, I reject the two main rival descriptions of the EU in the 1980s and 1990s as a supranational state or a site of interstate struggles and propose a third interpretation. This suggests that the emerging Europolity is a crucial political site in an evolving system of multi-scalar meta-governance, organized in the shadow of post-national statehood, of the contradictory and conflictual processes of Europeanization in a still emerging world society. However, while the EU is the dominant meta-governance instance in Europe, it has only a nodal role in global meta-governance. Second, drawing on the regulation approach and state theory, I argue that the concepts of welfare state and ‘competition state’ are too vague to grasp recent changes in political economy and statehood. Instead, I identify an ongoing transition from different forms of Keynesian welfare national state to different forms of Schumpeterian workfare postnational regime. And, third, drawing again on both approaches, I present some basic limits to the open method of coordination (hereafter OMC) as a key component of multi-scalar meta-governance for delivering the European Union’s strategic goal, set at the Lisbon summit (2000), ‘to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion,’ and respect for the environment’.
Before exploring the emerging Europolity in more detail, four initial state-theoretical remarks will be useful. First, all forms of state rest on the territorialization of political power. Nonetheless, a system of formally sovereign, mutually recognizing, mutually legitimating national states exercising sovereign control over large and exclusive territorial areas is only a relatively recent institutional expression of state power. Other modes of territorializing political power have existed, some still co-exist with the so-called Westphalian system (which was strongly instituted only in a series of steps in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries), new expressions are emerging, and yet others can be imagined. Once we allow for such variability in the forms of territorialization of political power, we can ask whether the EU is a supranational state with the same powers as a ‘national’ state rescaled upwards, a post-sovereign form of political authority, a nodal point in a global political system, a de-territorialized form of economic governance, and so on. The answer is not theoretically pre-given but should emerge from theoretically-informed empirical analysis and reflection.
Second, states do not exist in majestic isolation overseeing the rest of their respective societies but are embedded in a wider political system (or systems), articulated with other institutional orders, and linked to different forms of civil society. A key aspect of their transformation is the redrawing of the multiple lines of difference between the state and its environment(s) as states (and the social forces they represent) redefine their priorities, expand or reduce their activities, recalibrate or rescale them in the light of new challenges, seek greater autonomy or develop forms of power-sharing, and dis- or re-embed specific state institutions and practices within the social order. This holds for the international as well as national dimensions of state relations. The state’s frontiers or temporal horizons are not fixed. Instead there are continuing attempts to redesign its institutional architecture and modes of working of to enhance state capacities to achieve particular political objectives. This is especially clear for the European Union insofar as it is a polity in the process of (trans)formation and this process is being contested by many different social forces.
Third, societies can be dominated by different principles of Vergesellschaftung (societal organization), such as economic, military, religious, or political priorities, and this will be reflected in the state as a key site where power relations are crystallized in different forms (Mann 1986). Thus the state could operate primarily as a capitalist state, a military power, a theocratic regime, a representative democracy answerable to civil society, etc. There are competing principles of societalization linked to different functional systems and different identities and values anchored in civil society or the lifeworld and, in principle, any of these could become dominant, at least for a while. There is no unconditional guarantee that the modern state will always (or ever) be essentially capitalist, and, even where capital accumulation is the dominant axis of societalization, state managers typically have regard to other functional systems and the lifeworld in order to maintain a modicum of institutional integration and social cohesion within the state’s territorial boundaries. But such structural coherence and social cohesion is necessarily limited insofar as it depends on the displacement and/or deferral of the effects of certain contradictions and lines of conflict beyond its socially constituted spatio-temporal boundaries and horizons of action. Different kinds of spatio-temporal fix are significant here and they are closely connected to specific forms of government, governance, and meta-governance (Jessop 2002, 2006). All these issues apply to the European Union as a site of competing societalization projects – notably those that prioritize capitalist, democratic, security, or cultural goals in defining the nature and purposes of the European mission. This is especially clear in the Lisbon agenda and the continuing conflicts around the European Constitution.
Fourth, the ‘strategic-relational approach’ is useful in evaluating the changing nature of states and political regimes (as well as, indeed, changing accumulation regimes and their associated modes of regulation) (Jessop 2002). Seen in strategic-relational terms, the state is an asymmetrical institutional terrain on which different forces compete for power (Poulantzas 1978). Thus the EU must be studied in terms of the reciprocal interaction between two related sets of relations: first, the complex interaction between the institutional reorganization of European statehood within a broader set of political changes and its articulation to the reorganization of the capitalist mode of production on a world scale; and, second, the changing balance of forces that are attempting to shape or resist this double reorganization and to deploy the changed state capacities to promote new accumulation strategies, state projects, and hegemonic visions.
The regulation approach stresses that capital accumulation depends on a complex assemblage of economic and extra-economic conditions (see Boyer and Saillard 2002; Jessop and Sum 2006). For the capital relation is inherently contradictory, conflictual, and dilemmatic and, while its basic reproduction requirements can be discussed in general terms, their specific content emerges only ex post, through trial-and-error, if at all. This said, it is useful to note four basic dimensions of state involvement in securing capitalist reproduction – the specific form and content of which vary across accumulation regimes and modes of regulation. These dimensions derive from basic features of capitalism and comprise:
- Economic policy, broadly understood. State involvement occurs here because market forces alone cannot secure all the conditions of capitalist reproduction and must be supplemented by non-market mechanisms. This insufficiency is grounded in generic tendencies to market failure and specific contradictions and dilemmas linked to the capitalist mode of production.
- Social policy, broadly understood, covers interventions that reproduce labour power individually and collectively from to grave. This policy field matters because labour power is a fictitious commodity (Polanyi 1957; de Brunhoff 1968), i.e., while it is bought and sold in labour markets, it is not itself directly (re)produced in and by capitalist firms with a view to private profit. This poses economic problems regarding its individual and collective suitability to capital’s needs and its own survival in the absence of a secure income or other assets. It also involves issues of social inclusion and cohesion; and political problems about the legitimacy of social intervention and its relation to the various identities of workers, citizens, etc.
- The main scale, if any, on which economic and social policies are decided – even if underpinned or implemented on other scales. This is important as economic and social policies are politically mediated and the scales of political organization may not coincide with those of economic and social life.
- The relative weight of the mechanisms deployed in the effort to maintain capitalist profitability and reproduce labour-power by compensating for inevitable market failures and inadequacies. Top-down state intervention is just one of these mechanisms and states can resort to other technologies of governance (or governmentality) too. Moreover, as is well known, states can fail too. This suggests the need for additional supplementary mechanisms and, insofar as these may also fail, for attention to the balance among them.
On this basis, recent changes in the state in those advanced ‘Western’ capitalist societies that were integrated into the circuits of Atlantic Fordism during the 1950s and 1960s can be see, at least in stylized, ideal-typical terms, to involve a tendential and uneven movement from the Keynesian Welfare National State (KWNS) to the Schumpeterian workfare postnational regime (SWPR) (cf. Jessop 2002).
The distinctive features of the postwar state in most advanced capitalist societies on these four dimensions can be defined as a Keynesian welfare national state. First, in promoting the conditions for private capital accumulation in the Fordist era, it was distinctively Keynesian insofar as it aimed to secure full employment in a relatively closed national economy and pursued this goal through demand-side management. Second, in reproducing labour-power as a fictitious commodity, social policy had a distinctive welfare orientation insofar as it tried to generalize norms of mass consumption to all national citizens (and thereby contribute to effective domestic demand); and (b) to promote collective consumption favourable to the Fordist growth dynamic based on a virtuous national circle of mass production and mass consumption. Third, the KWNS was national insofar as economic and social policies were pursued within the historically specific (and socially constructed) matrix of a national economy, a national state, and a society seen as comprising national citizens. Within this matrix it was national states that were mainly held responsible for developing and guiding Keynesian full employment and welfare policies. Local and regional states acted mainly as relays for policies framed at the national level; and the various postwar international regimes were initially intended mainly to re-stabilize national economies and national states. And, fourth, the KWNS was statist insofar as state institutions (on different levels) were the chief supplement to market forces in securing economic growth and social cohesion. The combination of market and state on different levels prompted the use of the term ‘mixed economy’ to describe the postwar system (classically, Shonfield 1965).
There was never a pure KWNS. Instead different hybrid national forms existed in the broader international economic and political framework of Atlantic Fordism. These combined features from variants or sub-types of KWNS with other economic and social policy functions, scales of action, or modes of governance. The literature on different types of welfare regime and, more generally, varieties of capitalism captures much of this constrained variation (e.g., Esping-Andersen 1985; Hall and Soskice 2002; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000a, 2000b). Moreover, just as there was no generic KWNS, so, too, no generic crisis of Atlantic Fordism emerged to affect all advanced capitalist states identically. Nonetheless, all have faced similar pressures from recent changes and this is reflected in specific, path-dependent, nationally variable crises of the KWNS emerging in the mid-1970s and worsening in the 1980s.
The Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime
State responses to economic and social problems are always politically mediated through struggles to interpret the crisis and through strategically selective institutional mediations of responses to the crisis. Thus national variations in the pace, direction, and emerging patterns of the SWPR are often rooted in their respective initial starting points, differences in modes of growth and insertion into the global economy, and the institutional specificities and distinctive balance of forces. This means that, even if certain general tendencies can be identified and grounded in the logic of contemporary capitalism, this does not justify a simple, ‘one-size-fits-all’ account of welfare restructuring. Instead we must undertake comparative analyses to comprehend and explain observable variations as well as similarities.
The response to the crises in/of Atlantic Fordism is reflected in four general trends in state restructuring: (1) from Keynesian modes of intervention to Schumpeterian ones; (2) from a welfarist mode of reproduction of labour-power to a workfarist mode; (3) from the primacy of the national scale to a post-national framework in which no scale is predominant; and (4) from the primacy of the state in compensating for market failures to networked, partnership-based economic, political, and social governance mechanisms. Severally and together, these trends have developed quite differently in the various Atlantic Fordist economies. But the overall trend points to a Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime, described as follows.
First, regarding its functions for private capital, it is Schumpeterian insofar as it tries to promote permanent innovation and flexibility in relatively open economies by intervening on the supply-side and to strengthen as far as possible their structural and/or systemic competitiveness. This shift is sometimes described in terms of the rise of the ‘competition state’ (Cerny 1989; Altvater 1994; Hirsch 1995). This correctly identifies the increased importance of competition for economic policy but fails to specify the novelty of the state’s current role in promoting new forms of competitiveness. For there are many forms of competition and competitiveness and many ways for states to promote competition and enhance competitiveness. There have been important material and discursive changes here related to the relative exhaustion of the Fordist growth dynamic and the re-scaling and integration of the world market. In addition, the economy is no longer interpreted in narrow terms but has been extended to include many additional factors, deemed ‘non-economic’ under the KWNS regime, that affect economic performance. Innovation and enterprise have a key role here tied to widespread belief in a new long wave of technological change. This is reflected in the inclusion of general institutional features of societies as part of the new competitive race and in new international benchmarks to assess how well supranational blocs such as the EU, national states, regions, and cities can compete in an emerging, globalizing KBE.
The expansion of economic intervention has two paradoxical effects on the state. First, whilst it expands the potential scope of state intervention for economic purposes, top-down intervention becomes less effective – requiring that the state retreat from some traditional areas of intervention and develops new forms of intervention in others (Messner 1997). And, second, whilst it increases the range of stakeholders whose cooperation is required for successful state intervention, it also increases pressures within the state to create or, at least recruit, new subjects to act as its partners. Thus states are now trying to transform the identities, interests, capacities, rights, and responsibilities of economic and social forces so that they become more flexible, capable, and reliable agents of the state’s new economic strategies (Barry et al., 1996; Deakin and Edwards 1993; Jones 1999; and, for a political statement, Blair and Schröder 1999).
Second, regarding social reproduction, the SWPR can be described (at the risk of misunderstanding) as a workfare regime insofar as it subordinates social policy to the demands of labour market flexibility and employability and to the demands of competitiveness. In this sense, social policy is now modelled on human capital theory and becomes a form of human resources management. This also leads to the demotion of other, earlier policy objectives. Thus, whilst the KWNS sought to secure full employment directly, this is now regarded as an indirect effect of securing international competitiveness. Likewise, whereas the KWNS pursued a redistributive politics to promote social equality and equalize regional development, the SWPR accepts increasing economic, social, and regional inequalities and seeks to compensate for this through more limited policies against social exclusion. Similarly, whilst the KWNS tried to extend the social rights of its national citizens, the SWPR puts downward pressure on the social wage qua cost of international production. Moreover, even where there appears to be strong continuities with the KWNS, the SWPR gives the inherited features a new inflection tied to the new growth dynamics.
Third, compared with the earlier primacy of the national scale, the SWPR is ‘postnational‘ insofar as the increased significance of other spatial scales and horizons of action makes the national territory less important as a ‘power container’. This is associated with a transfer of economic and social policy-making functions upwards, downwards, and sideways. On a global level, this can be seen in the growing concern of a growing number of international agencies (such as the IMF, World Bank, OECD, and ILO), intergovernmental forums (such as the G8), and transnational elite groupings (such as the World Economic Forum) with shaping current economic and social policy agendas. The EU is both a key actor and an important stake in these activities (see below). At the same time, some aspects of economic and social policy-making are being devolved to the regional, urban, and local levels on the grounds that policies intended to influence the micro-economic supply-side and social regeneration are best designed close to their sites of implementation. This sometimes involves cross-border cooperation among regional, urban, or local spaces. In short, the primacy of the national in economic and social policy is being weakened in favour of a more complex pattern of post-national politics. This is accompanied by national states’ enhanced efforts to control the interscalar transfer and articulation of these powers – suggesting a shift from sovereignty to a primus inter pares role in intergovernmental relations. However, as the formal equality of sovereign states is clearly contradicted by continuing substantive technological, economic, military, political, and cultural inequalities, not all states are equally successful in this regard. The role of the USA is especially strong in this regard – as it was in the construction of Atlantic Fordism.
The post-national moment of economic and social policy restructuring is complicated by the proliferation of scales and the associated weakening of the national scale. There are clear differences among the triads here. NAFTA is primarily a continental trading system based on America’s dominance as a quasi-continental economy (itself comprising many different regional economies with different levels of economic performance) with Canada and Mexico being increasingly obliged to internalize US production and consumption norms as well as to find their place as best they can in an emerging continental division of labour. The East Asian triad has developed an increasingly important regional division of labour organized primarily under Japanese regional hegemony but it has no coherent institutional mechanisms to ensure effective co-ordination. The increasing size, scope, and weight of the Chinese economy are also leading to awkward and halting readjustments in the East Asian triad. The European Union provides the only example among the three triad regions of a clear commitment to economic, political, and social integration and, more ambivalently, as we shall see, to the development of supranational state structures. This said, all three triads are involved in different ways in the internationalization of policy regimes in economic, juridical, political, social and other fields. This excludes any easy generalization from the EU case to the other two triads – or vice versa.
Finally, regarding the mode of delivery of economic and social policies, the SWPR has become more regime-like compared to KWNS statism. This is reflected in the increased importance of non-state mechanisms in compensating for market failures and inadequacies and in delivering state-sponsored economic and social policies. One example is the expanding role of private-public networks on all levels – from local partnerships to supranational neo-corporatism (e.g., Clarke and Gaile 1998; Falkner 1998). The oft-remarked shift from government towards ‘governance’ (from imperative coordination to networking and other forms of self-organization) means that traditional forms of intervention are now less dominant in economic and social policy. While law and money have certainly not disappeared as steering mechanisms, these policy areas are now governed more through soft regulation and reflexive law, additionality and private-public partnerships, organizational intelligence and information-sharing, etc. A key role is played here by ‘meta-governance’, i.e., the organization of the institutional framework and rules for individual modes of governance and the re-balancing of different modes of governance. The OMC is an excellent example, as we shall see, of meta-governance at work.
How does this relate to the European Union?
The recent and continuing institutional redesign and strategic reorientation of the EU is part of this more general restructuring of the capitalist type of state. It is hardly surprising, of course, that all four shifts towards a SWPR can be found in the EU. For the proposed transition derives from theoretical analysis of developmental tendencies in capitalism combined with observation of national economies within the circuits of Atlantic Fordism. However, because the preceding account derives from North America and the Antipodes as well as from Northwestern Europe and also took the national economy and national state in Atlantic Fordism as its theoretical and historical starting point, it is worth asking whether these national tendencies also occur at the European level. This is even more relevant because economic and political forces operating at EU level are actively involved in the restructuring of national states and economies with a view to enhancing EU capacities to enhance competitiveness, a long-standing structural problem that has motivated many changes in the aims, objectives, and organization of the Europolity. Indeed, as Radaelli notes about the open method of coordination, ‘there are structural reasons for the appearance of the method in the EU policy process, most notably the long-term attempt of European policy-makers to get to grips with the problem of competitiveness. An implication is that the OMC is embedded in the master discourse of competitiveness. The latter defines the perimeter of what is politically feasible in terms of the ‘European social model’ (2003: 51; cf. de Búrca 2003 on the primacy of economic policy coordination in OMC processes and the obligation for other processes to be consistent with Broad Economic Policy Guidelines). Some of the implications of this constraint will become apparent below.
First, however, let us note that the EU’s overall economic orientation has turned towards a Schumpeterian strategy compared to an earlier period when it was more suited to Atlantic Fordism. European integration is rooted in the postwar reconstruction that prepared the ground for Atlantic Fordism in Europe (van der Pijl 1984; Ziltener 2001). Thus, in addition to their initial postwar role in restructuring iron, steel, and coal in this context, the European communities also emphasized the creation of an integrated market so that manufacturing firms could realize optimal economies of scale. This involved an essentially liberal Ordnungspolitik to create a single market and was an important supplement to the pursuit of national Keynesian policies — especially as the Treaty of Rome left official responsibility for employment policy at the national level. Indeed, as Sbragia notes, the EU’s basic constitutional framework structurally privileges liberal economic strategies: ‘the norm of economic liberalization, embedded in the Treaty of Rome, was reinforced and elaborated in the Single European Act and the Treaty of Maastricht’ (2000: 224). Thus even when the Delors’ presidency (1985-95) was marked by demands for a more active employment policy and a Social Europe, this occurred in an institutional context already biased in favour of liberalism and in an ideological climate dominated by neo-liberalism (on the structural biases, see also de Búrca 2003; Majone 1993; Moravcsik 2002; Scharpf 2002). Thus progress towards social integration proceeded less rapidly than that towards economic integration, which was also strongly imprinted with neo-liberalism. Thus there has been a greater advance towards monetary integration and deregulation than towards macro-economic coordination to promote economic growth and full employment, let alone towards common policies on social inclusion.
The six founding members of the European Economic Community (EEC) had modes of growth and regulation belonging to one or another of the regulated varieties of capitalism as well as one or another form of conservative-corporativist welfare regime or, in Italy’s case, a clientelist mediterranean welfare regime (cf. Ruigrok and van Tulder 1996; Hantrais 2000). This suggests that the institutionalized commitment to economic liberalism might initially have provided the basis for the integration and consolidation of regulated capitalism on a wider scale rather than serving as the means to push through a far-reaching liberal programme. The situation changed, however, as new members with different modes of growth, regulation, and welfare joined the European Community. This introduced greater economic and social heterogeneity and shifted the balance of forces in a neo-liberal direction. Eastwards expansion of the European Union has had a key role here – and one that is far from accidental. It has been correspondingly harder to create the conditions for re-scaling state planning from the national to the European level or to establish a tripartite Euro-corporatism (on Euro-corporatism, see Falkner 1998 and Vobruba 1995; and on its limits, Streeck 1995). This is reflected in the turn to the open method of coordination (OMC), which was officially consolidated in the Lisbon agenda with strong support from most of the founding members of the EEC and from Austria, Denmark, and Sweden.
Likewise, rather than seeing a re-scaling of the welfare state upwards to the European Union, EU social policy until the adoption of the Lisbon Agenda largely took the form of social regulation. This reflects the priority given to macro-economic measures and competitiveness, the reservation of important social policy powers to member states, and the variety of welfare models in Europe. These difficulties were reinforced through European Monetary Union (EMU). The Maastricht convergence criteria make it harder for member states (especially the smaller economies) to escape the neo-liberal framework and, in addition, the limited size of the EU budget prevents the Commission from funding a major expansion of a European welfare regime. The Growth and Stability Pact (GSP) has served, moreover, as a new ‘gold standard’, requiring conformity to relatively rigid norms of economic and political conduct favourable to a liberal (or money capital) view of economic stability and growth. In particular, EMU and the GSP require public spending cuts or constraints, social security and welfare reforms, and more or less significant privatization of state-owned enterprises and commercialization of public services. However, even in this context, there is significant interest in active involvement in promoting competitiveness, innovation, and enterprise in line with Schumpeterian ideas. Although the main thrust of this involvement accords well with neo-liberal strategy, it is flanked by neo-statist and neo-corporatist strategies, illustrated by EU technology policies and social policy respectively (for these three variants of the SWPR, see Jessop 2002). In this context, we should note the resurgence of corporatism in a new guise – social pacts oriented to wage restraint, social security reform, supply-side competitiveness, and general conformity to the logic of the new monetary system (see Regini 2000; Grote and Schmitter 1999; Rhodes 1998).
Second, welfare and social policy remained a national competence in the founding treaties of the European Community with the result that policy-making at European level in these fields has systematically lagged behind macro-economic, industrial and technology policies. Thus, as Kuhnle noted, ‘[t]here exists as of today no European social law on the basis of which individual citizens can claim benefits from Brussels; no direct taxation or social contributions to EU which can finance social welfare; and there hardly exists any welfare bureaucracy in the EU’ (1999: 6). Yet there is growing evidence of a complex and complicated reorientation of welfare policy at the European level. This involves two apparently contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, some welfare policies (such as equal pay, equal opportunities, portable welfare benefits, minimum standards for health and security at work, and rules on working hours) have been gradually moved to the EU level to supplement the more traditional nationally-scaled welfare measures; and some structural policies have also been re-scaled to the EU to facilitate industrial restructuring, compensate for uneven regional development, support agriculture, and help to regenerate declining communities. On the other hand, the emergence of social policy at this level tends to assume a workfare rather than welfare orientation. This is quite clear in the Lisbon Strategy (2000), which gives more emphasis to social integration and to ‘modernize’ social policy in line with the alleged needs of global competitiveness. This reinforced the realignment of national employment policies through workfare measures such as increasing flexibility and activation policies and the reform of social protection systems to make them less costly and more market-friendly). It is also reflected in the tendential Europeanization of labour market policies, the transformation of national corporatist and bargaining arrangements, and the development of ‘social pacts’. In short, there is a growing mix of welfare and workfare strategies at the European level; but they are unified around the concern to create the conditions for an effective single market in post-Fordist rather than Fordist conditions.
An early sign of this reorientation was the European Commission’s White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, Employment (1993). This reviewed a wide range of factors affecting Europe’s competitiveness, capacity to generate good jobs, and sustainable economic growth. It recommended a wide range of trans-European macro-economic, environmental, infrastructural, technological, educational, vocational, and social policy initiatives that might address the challenges of the coming century. For example, it called for a broad ‘advanced training offensive’ and other measures to enhance labour market flexibility. The 1994 EU summit in Essen concluded that employment policies could no longer be conducted successfully solely at national level in conditions of European integration and globalization. The Amsterdam Treaty finally embedded a commitment to full employment as a ‘matter of common concern’ for the EU, translated this into the goal of reaching a ‘high level of employment’ without undermining competitiveness, and established an Employment Committee to discuss policy in this area and monitor progress. In line with the EU penchant for ‘meta-governance’ rather than imperative coordination, however, the Community’s responsibility in this area is to complement member state activities by developing a ‘coordinated strategy’, to formulate common guidelines, to establish benchmarks and ‘best practice’, and to monitor national action plans for employment. This workfarist reorientation of social policy at the EU level is related to the expansion of the ‘economic’ domain into areas previously regarded as non-economic. One aspect of this, as Deppe, Felder, and Tidow (2003) note, is that, for the first time, the breadth of EU labour market guidelines forced the ministries of economy, culture, finance, welfare and labour to engage in ‘joined-up thinking’ and present a joint plan (for further evidence along these lines, see Zeitlin 2005b). This approach was consolidated at the Lisbon Summit in 2000 (see below).
Third, almost by definition, European economic and social policy illustrates the post-national nature of the emerging welfare regimes and, indeed, a broader role in agenda-setting and policy-implementation for international institutions, supranational apparatuses, intergovernmental organizations and forums, transnational think tanks, and transnational interest groups and social movements (cf. Deacon 1997; Grande and Pauly 2005; on policy transfer, see Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Peck and Theodore 2001; and Stella 2000). Of course, as Deacon and Hulse (1997) note, such bodies differ in their policy recommendations; but such disagreements should not be exaggerated. For it is the bodies aligned with the ‘Washington consensus’ that tended to be most influential in the internationalization of economic and social policy. In particular, they note some convergence between EU and OECD policies as the EU accepted the adverse impact on competitiveness of Keynesian welfare policies and the OECD’s Directorate of Education, Employment, Labour and Social Affairs recognized the economic benefits of income support programmes (1997: 45-58). This development, mediated through an increasingly dense web of formal and informal ‘parallel power networks’, reflects the increased formation of a transnational capitalist class concerned to secure the conditions for global capital accumulation. This involves a ‘new constitutionalism’ (Gill 2001), i.e., an attempt to establish a new articulation between the economic and the political on a global rather than merely national scale. But it is also associated, as noted above, with attempts to re-articulate the relationship between the economic and the extra-economic conditions for capital accumulation in a globalizing, post-Fordist, knowledge-based economy.
The EU is a key player as well as a key site in the struggles to shape this new constitutional settlement. Considered as an institutional ensemble that provides a particular, strategically selective terrain of action, it acts, inter alia, both as a major relay for American neo-liberal pressures to redesign the world order and as an advocate of an alternative European model. Its central role in this regard also makes it a crucial site for contending political forces both within and beyond the EU as they seek to shape its overall strategic direction and/or specific economic and social policies (cf. Ziltener 2001; van Apeldoorn 2002). This can be seen in its general commitment to the reorientation of economic and social policy away from the primacy of the national scale in postwar ‘embedded liberalism’ towards a post-national ‘embedded neo-liberalism’ – albeit one inflected differently from the hegemonic American model. At the same time, however, the tendential Europeanization of economic and social policy is closely linked, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, to the increased role of subnational and cross-national agencies, territorial and/or functional in form, in its formulation and implementation. In this regard there is an interesting scalar division of labour between the EU, national states, and sub-national tiers of government. For, whereas national states retain significant powers in the traditional spheres of the sovereign state (military, police) and in welfare policy (where the limited EU budget blocks a major role in general social redistribution even if it acquired this competence), the EU has gained growing, albeit often strongly contested, influence over economic policy.
Fourth, because the EU has never acquired a significant number of features typical of a supranational sovereign state or even a confederation of states, it cannot be said to have undergone a straightforward shift from supranational government to supranational governance. But it has developed an increasingly wide and deep array of governance capacities that enable it to influence economic and social policy in most areas and on most scales. An important dimension of this development is conventionally referred to multi-level governance (MLG) and is concerned to reconcile key European aims and objectives with persisting national diversity in terms of institutions and performance, with the EU commitment to subsidiarity, and with recognition of the desirability to involve an increasing array of stakeholders in EU policy formulation, decision-making, and policy implementation. Three key features of the EU give it special capacities to engage in such multi-level governance across different tiers of government, different functional systems, and different stakeholders (Sbragia 2000). First, the role of judges and litigation enables the EU to override national laws and to ‘constitutionalize’ the treaties. Second, EU institutions are located at the heart of information flows that give them a relative monopoly in organizational intelligence and provide a means to steer conduct. Third, the EU’s fiscal poverty limits its vulnerability to claims on public spending and thereby circumscribes the political agenda. In addition, the increasing adoption of European projects and guidelines entitles the EU to monitor national and regional state activities and partnerships across an increasingly interconnected set of policy areas, thereby giving it a means, in principle if not actual practice, to steer national policy and endow it with greater coherence (de Búrca and Zeitlin 2003; Majone 1993; Telò 2002; Wallace 2000).
What is conventionally called multi-level governance is often viewed as a ‘third way’ between supranational imperative coordination and standardization, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a relatively anarchic, negatively co-ordinated, and fragmented pursuit of common economic, social, and political objectives. Its full significance becomes even more evident, however, if it is termed multi-scalar meta-governance. The notion of MLG could prove misleading on four grounds: (a) it focuses on levels of political organization in a nested territorial hierarchy and, in this sense, reflects the period when the main axis of theoretical and political debate concerned the respective merits of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism; (b) it directs attention to relations of vertical interdependence, communication, and joint decision-making without emphasizing the tangled and shifting nature of dominant, nodal, and marginal levels of government in different areas; (c) it tends to focus on specific policy and issue areas rather than co-ordination problems across different areas; and (d) despite reference to governance, it is often more concerned with government and, when it does deal with governance, it neglects problems of ‘meta-governance’. In practice, however, many studies of MLG have escaped these potential traps in their theoretical and/or empirical analyses. It would nonetheless be more precise and productive to discuss such institutional patterns, political practices, and policy processes in terms of multi-scalar meta-governance. This alternative concept highlights: (a) the irreducible plurality of levels, scales, areas, and sites that are involved in, affected by, and/or mobilized in these institutions, practices, and processes; (b) the complex, tangled, and interwoven nature of the relevant political relations, which include important horizontal and transversal linkages – indicated in notions such as ‘network state’ or ‘network polity’ – as well as the vertical linkages implied in multi-level governance; (c) the importance of meta-governance as the reflexive art of balancing government and other forms of governance to create requisite variety, flexibility, and adaptability in coordinated policy-formulation, policy-making, and implementation; and (d) the plurality and, indeed, heterogeneity of actors potentially involved in such institutions and practices, which stretch well beyond different tiers of government and well beyond the confines of the European Union as an administrative, political, or economic space. This is quite explicit in Lisbon European Council statement itself, which recommends not only that the European Council pursue a more coherent and systematic approach to governance be guided by the European Council but also that this should involve a ‘fully decentralized approach … applied in line with the principle of subsidiarity in which the Union, the Member States, the regional and local levels, as well as the social partners and civil society, will be actively involved, using variable forms of partnership (2000, paragraphs 37-38).
Supranational State, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, or Something Else?
The development of multi-scalar meta-governance fits neither the supranational nor the liberal intergovernmental model (a paradigmatic dichotomy suited to the Fordist phase of European integration) but reflects a new polity-building strategy appropriate to the emerging, globalizing, knowledge-based economy and Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime. This new model has been developing for some time. The initial steps towards Western European integration were concerned, as Ziltener (1999) argues, with integrating Western Europe into Atlantic Fordism. The ‘Monnet mode of integration’ was concerned to create a ‘Keynesian-corporatist’ (sic) form of statehood on the European level favourable to different national Fordist modes of development. However, the emerging crises in/of national Fordism(s) and of Atlantic prompted a crisis in European integration and the search for a new mode of integration. What emerged was the internal market project – with important conflicts between neo-liberal, neo-corporatist, and neo-statist currents and, eventually, a hybrid model premised on neo-liberalism. This involves new modes of economic and political coordination that aim to promote the EU’s competitiveness in the new global economy whilst maintaining (and ‘modernizing’) the European social model. In this context competitiveness and social policy have been redefined in Schumpeterian workfare terms and the tasks of integration and coordination are increasingly seen as multi-level (or multi-scalar) with variable geometries and hence as suited to new forms of partnership and governance.
It is clearly premature to make predictions when the future of the new European constitution is in doubt and the emerging forms and functions of the European Union have been challenged by the increased priority of geo-political over geo-economic issues associated with the Bush administration’s self-serving insistence that the ‘war on terrorism’ is the major problem currently confronting world society today. But the overall direction of recent changes in the EU does seem to be towards multi-scalar meta-governance in the shadow of postnational statehood. This contrasts with the usual stories about rescaling the traditional form of sovereign statehood or revamping the intergovernmentalism inherited from earlier integration rounds. For EU institutions typically operate less in the manner of a re-scaled, supranational sovereign state apparatus than as a nodal point in an extensive web of meta-governance operations. They have a key role in orchestrating economic and social policy in and across many different scales of action involving a wide range of official, quasi-official, private economic, and civil interests (Tömmel 1994, 1998; Ekengren 1997; Willke, 1992, 1996; Sbragia 2000). That such activities do not conform to the traditional notion of the exercise of state power has made it hard to see their significance for the overall dynamic of state formation at the European level. To show what is at stake here, it is worth exploring ‘meta-governance’ in more detail.
Meta-governance refers initially to attempts to redesign individual modes of coordination to improve their performance – modifying market rules and reordering the relations among markets, redesigning organizations, inter-organizational relations, and organizational ecologies, and reflexively re-organizing the conditions of self-organization through dialogue and deliberation. But it also includes what Dunsire (1996) cleverly terms ’collibration’, i.e., the judicious mixing of market, hierarchy, and networks to modify strategic selectivities and improve overall outcomes. The Lisbon agenda is a good illustration of such efforts because it reinforced and, indeed, elevated this emerging approach into a key operating principle under the rubric of the ‘open method of coordination’. As an institutionalized form of multi-scalar meta-governance, the OMC involves collibration in an unstable equilibrium of compromise rather than a systematic, consistent resort to a single method of coordination to deal with a fixed pattern of complex interdependence. It is also part of a more general ‘coordination of coordination’ (Dale 2004) at the EU level and, indeed, on more general scales too. As a form of meta-governance, the emphasis is on a combination of ‘super-vision’ and ‘supervision’, i.e., a relative monopoly of organized intelligence and overall monitoring of adherence to benchmarks (Willke 1996; cf. Majone 1997). Apparent inconsistencies may be part of an overall self-organizing, self-adjusting practice of meta-governance within a complex division of government and governance powers.
However, as every practice is prone to failure, meta-governance may also fail. This does not prevent continued attempts at collibration and efforts to improve the chances of success by keeping a repertoire of responses, promoting reflexivity, and seeking consent for new projects. Thus we have seen (and continue to witness) repeated rounds of meta-constitutional dialogue (Walker 2000: 17-21) about the overall design of the Europolity as well as increasing resort and expansion of comitology, social dialogue, public-private partnerships, mobilization of non-governmental organizations and social movements, etc., as integral elements in attempts to guide European integration and steer European Union policy-making and implementation (Scott and Trubek 2002). The codification and rewriting of the EU Constitution (since stalled electorally) and the resulting efforts to introduce some of its key provisions through other means are a good illustration of this meta-constitutional practice and its permanent passive revolution. There is a synergetic division of meta-governance labour in this evolving framework between the European Council, the specialized Councils, and the European Commission. The European Council is the political meta-governance network of prime ministers that decides on the overall political dynamic around economic and social objectives, providing a ‘centripetal orientation of subsidiarity’ (Telò 2002: 253), acting by qualified majority, and playing a key intergovernmental and monitoring role. The European Commission plays a key meta-governance role in organizing parallel power networks, providing expertise and recommendations, developing benchmarks, monitoring progress, exchanging best practice, promoting mutual learning, and ensuring continuity and coherence across Presidencies. This is associated with increasing networking across old and new policy fields at the European level as well as with a widening range of economic, political, and social forces that are being drawn into multi-level consultation, policy formulation, and policy implementation. Thus, overall, multi-level meta-governance is allegedly ‘being made more precise and applied (with adaptations as for its intensity) to other fundamental policy fields, traditionally under the competence of national and sub-national authorities: education, structural reform and internal market, technological innovation and knowledge-based society, research and social protection’ (Telò 2002: 253).
From a strategic-relational perspective, this clearly implies a shift in the strategic selectivities of the modes of governance and meta-governance in the European Union. For, while it builds on past patterns of liberal intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalist spillover, it has its own distinctive momentum and tends to weaken more hierarchical forms of coordination (whether intergovernmental or supranational). It also entails complementary changes in the strategic selectivities of national states and subordinate levels of government and governance, calling for new forms of strategic coordination and new forms (meta-)governance in and across a wide range of policy fields. A key issue here is how rescaling affects the access of different economic, social, cultural, and other interests to agenda setting, decision-making, and policy implementation – an issue reflected not only in the democratic deficit but also in the growing importance of transnational business interests in meta-scalar meta-governance. This system is still evolving and, given the inherent tendencies to failure typical of all major forms of governance (market, hierarchy, network, etc.) as well as meta-governance itself, continuing experimentation, improvisation, and adaptation is only to be expected (cf. Dehousse 2002; Radaelli 2003; Zeitlin 2005b).
The Lisbon Agenda
The mid-term review of the Lisbon agenda by the High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok (2004) was prompted in part by the recognition that its objectives for 2010 would not be obtained (cf. Archibugi and Coco 2005). Its report implicitly reveals several problems with multi-scalar meta-governance. First, the turn from the mixed economy to private-public partnership does not establish a neutral site in which the conflicting logics of capital accumulation, state legitimation, and social cohesion (let alone sustainable development) can be resolved but adds another site at which their relative weight can be contested by a reconstituted and reorganized set of actors. This is reflected in contradictions inscribed in the Lisbon agenda itself, with its commitments to joining the treadmill of an ever-widening competitive race in a globalizing, knowledge-based economy dominated by a neo-liberal logic in which bad regulation threatens to drive out good, to improve the political efficiency and efficacy of European decision-making and overcome the democratic deficit, to the economically-conditioned but politically-mediated demands of social cohesion and inclusion (which would limit pursuit of neo-liberalism in a European context), and to the increasingly visible, vehemently contested, and hard to satisfy material-social requirements of sustainable development. Thus the general aim of the Lisbon agenda left considerable scope for rival interpretations, with different fractions of capital, different varieties of capitalism, different welfare models, and different stakeholders at play. While the main agenda has been represented as a compromise between neo-liberalism and the Scandinavian model and between EU apparatuses concerned with economic and social issues respectively (Zeitlin 2005; Bertozzi and Bonoli 2002), responsibility for managing the tetralemma posed by these competing commitments was delegated downward national states and networks through the OMC. This served to displace rather than resolve the tetralemma, leading to multiple solutions reflecting different national traditions and current policy preferences, different economic and social starting points, and different degrees of flexibility in the capacity to adopt the agenda. Nonetheless, primacy remains with economic objectives over the social, political, and environmental.
Second, meta-governance, like other forms of governance, often fails because of over-simplification of the conditions of action and/or deficient knowledge about the various causal connections affecting the object of (meta-)governance. This is especially problematic when this object is inherently complex, multi-scalar, multi-temporal, multi-centric, and contradictory, such as capitalist development on a global scale and the optimal approach to inserting local, regional, national, and supranational economic spaces into this dynamic. In this sense, while state managers may propose to steer it, what disposes is the logic of capital working behind the backs of state managers as well as the producers. While the OMC is intended to integrate reflexivity, deliberation, benchmarking, and so on, there is actually rather limited scope for mutual learning and policy transfer in the Lisbon process. This is visible in the failure of the Kok review itself to take account of internal and external evidence on successes and failures of different OMC processes (Zeitlin 2004). In addition, given the problems of setting appropriate bench-marks, which should neither be too hard nor too easy for all member states, the incentives for key players to adopt cynical, opportunistic, or fatalistic attitudes to the Lisbon goals. Indeed, ‘[m]ember states are held responsible for achieving the targets within their territory irrespective of their size (in terms of GDP, population or spatial extension) and power, and irrespective of the territorial origins of the problems to be solved’ (Zängle 2004: 10). This ensures that setting benchmarks is a highly politicized process and the associated ‘naming and shaming’ creates incentives for blame avoidance and buck-passing. The OMC as practised to date also ignores local knowledge in favour of a general commitment to neo-liberalism (Radaelli 2003).
Third, even without this unstable tetralemmatic political compromise and the limited capacity for mutual learning, the basic competitive weakness of an unevenly developed, expanding European economic space would have made it hard to attain the over-ambitious Lisbon goals. The agenda was established at the height of the ‘new economy’ bubble with its irrational exuberance about an era of permanent growth based on the knowledge-based economy and modelled, in particular, on US economic resurgence after many anxious years of alleged threat from East Asia and Europe. The consensus on pursuit of the Lisbon Strategy with its newly designated OMC as well as other measures was expected to enable a rapid convergence among European economies and a speedy catch-up with the USA and East Asia provided that the right mechanisms were put in place. This euphoria ignored the underlying economic realities and led to setting of the general aim and particular benchmarks at levels that almost guaranteed failure at European level and, even more significantly, in particular member states. This suggests a significant degree of symbolic politics was involved in the initial Lisbon process and that this has created incentives for member states to approach the process in a cynical, fatalistic, or stoical manner.
Fourth, the OMC is handicapped by the absence of robust flanking and supporting measures at different scales, which could operate over different time horizons and across different policy domains. Too much weight is placed on benchmarking and information, too little on adequate material resourcing and symbolic support, especially where economic and political calculation and resistance lead to alternative lines of action (or inaction). The mechanisms for mutual learning are relatively weak, in many cases due to inadequate integration of local stakeholders and local knowledge (an opportunity left to national states to exploit or not), and there is limited engagement of social movements and local states. It is also proving difficult to combine horizontal integration across different policy fields with vertical coordination among cities, regions, member states, and European Union institutions and actors. This is reflected in the call under the new Barroso Presidency for new reform partnerships between the European Commission and member states as well as between national governments and domestic stakeholders in order to enhance the effectiveness of national reform programmes within the overall Lisbon project.
This said, the OMC as it initially developed in the field of employment policy has become, for good or ill, a leading paradigm for the more general development of the Europolity, especially in sensitive or contested policy areas (for a generally positive view, see Zeitlin 2005b; for a more negative view, see Radaelli 2003). For, as Overdest notes, through its combination of vertical (EU-led) and horizontal (member state-led) coordination, its strategically selective inclusion of a wide range of social partners, and its emphasis on ‘super-vision’, experimentation, and monitoring, it offers a potential exit from the political stalemate as well as a way ‘to supercede the vicious cycle of state and market failure’ (2002: 14-15). It is being applied across many policy areas, including employment, innovation and enterprise, structural reform and the knowledge-based economy, education and training, social inclusion, pensions, health care, asylum seekers and immigration (for a comprehensive archive of research studies, see UW-Madison EUC 2006). There is more meta-constitutional and meta-governance work to do before this emerging system can become more coherent and institutionalized and, in particular, the continuing democratic deficit must be addressed through increasing transparency and widening the range of participants in order to limit social exclusion. Moreover, meta-governance failure is an ever-present possibility – especially in a world market, interstate system, and world society subject to the (il)logic of a neoliberal global capitalism. This calls into question whether even a revamped system of multi-scalar meta-governance in the shadow of post-national statehood could ever be enough to secure the ambitious Lisbon goals. For, in strategic-relational terms, this emerging institutional framework and associated political practices provides a new terrain for struggle, not a technical fix that automatically removes the contradictions and conflicts of capitalism and the strategic dilemmas and problems generated by the separation of the economic and political in capitalist societies. Thus, despite the renewed commitment to rebalancing neo-liberal economic policies, a modernized welfare state, and securing sustainable development and despite the contribution of the OMC to widening the range of participants in multi-scalar meta-governance, the prevailing balance of forces within EU institutions and within the wider economic and political order still privileges the first of these, acknowledges the importance of social integration based on a ‘modernized’ welfare state, and largely pays lip service to a sustainable environment.
I offer four concluding remarks. First, there is a tendential shift from some form of KWNS to some form of SWPR in most economies and regions once dominated by Atlantic Fordism. As such, the SWPR can be understood as a still emerging response to the crisis of the Atlantic Fordist mode of growth (and its specific instantiations in different national and regional models of postwar capitalism in Atlantic Fordism) and/or to the associated crisis of the KWNS (again in one or other of its variant forms). Hence, whilst there are historically specific institutional dynamics and specific configurations of social forces in different areas of economic and social policy (and, indeed, their nationally specific demarcations and sub-divisions), these policy areas also share material, social, and spatio-temporal linkages that require growing attention to their overall coherence and coordination in a post-Fordist period. This profound reorientation of economic and social policy is closely related to their rescaling and shifts in governance and delivery. This is due partly to changes in accumulation and partly to the crisis of the national state as the primary scale for organizing the Fordist mode of regulation. This requires increasing attention to activities above, below, and beyond national borders and to their coordination in tangled hierarchies of networked institutions, organizations, and individuals. This explains why there is a shift towards multi-scalar meta-governance in the shadow of postnational statehood within the EU and elsewhere.
Second, we can expect continuing divergences in economic and social policy regimes, reflecting the path-dependent legacies of different models of capitalism, different state traditions, different balances of forces, and different accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects. In some cases there has been greater continuity, linked to the dominance of the view that there was a crisis in the welfare state, with largely incremental shifts towards the new welfare regime (e.g., Denmark in the 1990s); in others there has been greater discontinuity – admittedly more marked in declared policy changes than actual policy outcomes – linked to a discursively-constructed crisis of the welfare state (e.g., Britain under Thatcher, Major, and Blair). There are two complicating factors here, especially in distinguishing the North American and Antipodean cases from Europe. The first concerns the development and intervention of the EU as a strongly institutionalized form of supranational coordination of responses to the crisis of Atlantic Fordism. The second is the shift to a globalizing, knowledge-based economy. But these divergences will develop in the context of struggles over the future shape of the global division of labour, the relation between the three main triad powers, and, especially, the relation between the USA and Europe. This is another reason why it is too simple (and simplistic) to talk of a generalized transition from the welfare state to the competition state.
Third, the EU’s future position and activities in promoting economic growth must be related to an emerging re-territorialized, de-statized, and internationalized Staatenwelt. We are witnessing the re-scaling of the complexities of government and governance rather than the re-scaling of the sovereign state or the emergence of just another arena in which national states pursue national interests. From a strategic-relational viewpoint, it is misleading to regard the EU as a supranational state or a mere site of competing intergovernmental and corporate interests. This is why I have suggested the concept of multi-scalar meta-governance in the shadow of post-national statehood. For, on the one hand, given the growing problems of complex reciprocal interdependence involved in economic, social, and political steering, the capacities of the European Union to engage in multi-level meta-governance depend on coordinating its activities with other major interests (and vice versa). And, on the other hand, although this means that the European Union cannot act like a rescaled national sovereign state, it does have distinctive capacities that enable it to be a co-director in the complex and open process of coordination of European economic and social policies in an emerging Schumpeterian workfare postnational regime.
Fourth, the key players involved in such multi-scalar meta-governance extend well beyond the borders of the EU and, indeed, one rather asymmetrical but nonetheless symptomatic proposal has been made to include the United States as a formal (if shadowy) partner in deliberations over the future of Europe (Bergsten 2003). This overly explicit suggestion apart, there are many parallel power networks that serve to integrate the EU into an emerging, hypercomplex, and chaotic system of global governance (or, better, meta-governance). In this sense, the EU is a crucial, if complex, point of intersection (or node) in this system. But it is still one node among several therein and cannot be fully understood without considering its complex relations with other nodes located above, below, and transversally to the EU itself. Thus, while the EU may be the dominant level for multi-scalar meta-governance in Europe, it is nodal rather than dominant in the more general multi-scalar meta-governance of an emerging world society still dominated by an imperial and imperialist American hegemon. But how long the USA can maintain the support of its economic, military, and political allies in sustaining this role remains to be seen.
 In writing this paper I have benefited from the comments of two anonymous referees as well as discussions with Henrik Bang, Neil Brenner, Gerry Stoker, Erik Swyngedouw, and Ngai-Ling Sum,.
 This last objective was re-specified in 2001 as a ‘sustainable environment’.
 Social policy is not reducible to the reproduction of labour-power, especially given the importance of other axes of societalization besides economic growth.
 More specifically, the circuit included the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, north-western Europe, and, later, as peripheral Fordist economies, the countries of southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Greece).
 There were also generic features of the capitalist type of state that characterized the postwar welfare regime but they will be ignored here.
 A crisis in Atlantic Fordism is one that could be resolved within its framework; a crisis of Atlantic Fordism is one that requires movement beyond this accumulation regime and/or mode of regulation for its resolution. This distinction is complicated by the struggles that occur in response to crises to define them as crises in or of a given structure or system (cf. Jessop 2002).
 These indicators include those of the World Economic Forum and International Institute of Management Development.
 The Amsterdam School of transnational historical materialism distinguishes a liberal, money capital conception of economic organization and policy and a productivist, industrial capital conception. For its views on the European Union, see van Apeldoorn (2002).
 Collibration may also include other modes of coordination, too, such as self-help and solidarity.
 Telò is discussing the OMC but his comment also applies to other forms of metagovernance, such as partnership, comitology, and social dialogue.
Altvater, E. (1994) ‘Operationsfeld Weltmarkt oder: Die Transformation des souveränen Nationalstaats in den nationalen Wettbewerbsstaat’, Prokla, 97, 517-547.
Archibugi, D. and Coco, A. (2005) ‘Is Europe becoming the Most Dynamic Knowledge Economy in the World?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 43 (3), 433-59.
Barry, A., Osborne, R., and Rose, N., eds (1996) Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism and Rationalities of Government, London: UCL Press.
Bergsten, F.C. (2003) ‘The G-2: a new conceptual basis and operating modality for Transatlantic economic relations’, Paper for the Second meeting of the Transatlantic Strategy Groups, Miami, 12-14 February.
Bertozzi, F. and G. Bonoli (2002) ‘Europeanisation and the convergence of national social and employment policies: What can the open method of coordination achieve?’, Paper for the ECPR joint sessions of workshops, Turin, 22–27 March.
Blair, T. and Schröder, G. (1999) Europe: the Third Way/Die Neue Mitte, reproduced in U. Hombach (2000), The Politics of the New Centre, Cambridge: Polity, 157-177.
Boyer, R. and Saillard, Y., eds (2002) Régulation Theory. The State of the Art, London: Routledge.
de Brunhoff, S. (1968) The State, Capital and Economic Policy, London: Pluto Press.
Cerny, P. (1989) The Changing Architecture of the State, London: Sage.
Clarke, S.E. and Gaile, G.L. (1998) The Work of Cities, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Dale, R. (2004) ‘Forms of Governance, governmentality and the EU’s Open Method of coordination’, in W. Larner and W. Wallace, eds, Global Governmentality, London: Routledge, 174-194.
Deacon, B. (1997) Global Social Policy: International Organizations and the Future of Welfare, London: Sage.
Deacon, B. and Hulse, M. (1997) ‘The making of post-communist social policy: the role of international agencies’, Journal of Social Policy, 26 (1), 43-62.
Deakin, N. and Edwards, J. (1993) The Enterprise Culture and the Inner City, London: Routledge.
De Búrca, G. (2003) ‘The constitutional challenge of new governance in the European Union’, European Law Review, 28 (6), 813-839.
De Búrca, G. and Zeitlin, J. (2003) ‘Constitutionalising the Open Method of Coordination: What should the Convention propose?’, Brussels: Center For European Policy Studies, CEPS Policy Brief No. 31.
Dehousse, R. (2002) ‘The Open Method of Coordination: a new policy paradigm?’, Paper prepared for the ECPR 1st Pan-European Conference on European Union Politics, 26-28 September, Bordeaux.
Deppe, F., Felder, M., and Tidow, S. (2003) ‘Structuring the state — the case of European employment policy’, in B. Kohler-Koch, ed, Linking EU and National Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 175-200.
Dolowitz, D. And Marsh, D. (1996) ‘Who learns what from whom? A review of the policy transfer literature’, Political Studies, 44 (2), 343-357.
Dunsire, A. (1996) ‘Tipping the balance: autopoiesis and governance’, Administration and Society, 28 (3), 299-334.
Ekengren, M. (1997) ‘The temporality of European governance’, in K.E. Jorgensen, ed., Reflective Approaches to European Governance, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 69-86.
Esping-Anderson, G. (1985) Politics against Markets, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
European Commission (1993) White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, Employment, Brussels: Office of Publications of European Commission.
Falkner, G. (1998) EU Social Policy in the 1990s: Towards a Corporatist Policy Community, London: Routledge.
Gill, S. (2001) ‘Constitutionalising capital: EMU and disciplinary neo-liberalism’, in A. Bieling and A.D. Morton, eds, Social Forces in the Making of the New Europe, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 47-69.
Grande, E. and Pauly, L.W. (2005) ‘Complex sovereignty and the emergence of transnational authority’, in idem, eds, Complex Sovereignty: Reconstituting Political Authority in the Twenty-first Century, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 285-300.
Grote, J.R. and Schmitter, P.C. (1999) ‘The renaissance of national corporatism?’ Transfer: Quarterly of the European Trade Union Institute, 5 (1-2), 34-63.
Hall, P.A. and Soskice, D. (2002) Varieties of Capitalism: the Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hantrais, L. (2000) Social Policy in the European Union, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Hirsch, J. (1995) Der nationale Wettbewerbsstaat. Staat, Demokratie und Politik im globalen Kapitalismus, Berlin: VSA.
Jessop, B. (2002) The Future of the Capitalist State, Cambridge: Polity.
Jessop, B. (2004) ‘Multi-level governance and multi-level meta-governance’, in I. Bache and M. Flinders, eds, Multi-Level Governance, Oxford: OUP, 49-74.
Jessop, B. (2006) ‘Spatial fixes, temporal fixes, and spatio-temporal fixes’, in D. Gregory and N. Castree, eds., David Harvey: a Critical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, 142-166.
Jessop, B. and N.L. Sum (2006) Beyond the Regulation Approach: Putting Capitalist Economies in their Place, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Jones, M. (1999), New Institutional Spaces: TECs and the Remaking of Economic Governance, London: Jessica Kingsley.
Kok, W. (2004) Facing the challenge. The Lisbon strategy for growth and employment. Report from the High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok, Luxemburg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities
Kuhnle, S. (1999) ‘Survival of the European Welfare State’, Oslo: Arena Working Paper 99/19.
Lisbon European Council (2000) ‘Presidency Conclusions, 23 And 24 March 2000, http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/lis1_en.htm, last accessed 10.02.2006
Majone, G. (1993) ‘The European Community between social policy and social regulation’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31 (2), 153-170.
Majone, G. (1997) ‘The New European Agencies: Regulation by information’, Journal of European Public Policy, 4 (2), 262-75.
Mann, M. (1986) The Sources of Social Power. Volume I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Messner, D. (1997) The Network Society: Economic Development and International Competitiveness as Problems of Social Governance, London: Frank Cass.
Moravcsik, A. (2002) ‘In defence of the ‘‘democratic deficit’’: reassessing legitimacy in the European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (4), 603-624.
Overdest, C. (2002) ‘The Open Method of Coordination, new governance and learning: towards a research agenda, http://www.wisc.edu/wage/papers/OMCtr.pdf, last accessed 20.01.2003.
Peck, J. and Theodore, N. (2001) ‘Exporting workfare/importing welfare-to-work: exploring the politics of Third Way Policy transfer’, Political Geography, 20 (5), 427-460.
Polanyi, K. (1957) The Great Transformation: the Economic and Political Origins of Our Time, Boston: Beacon Press.
Poulantzas, N. (1978) State, Power, Socialism, London: Verso.
Radaelli, C.M. (2003) The Open Method of Coordination: a New Governance Architecture for Europe? Stockholm: Swedish Institute of European Policy Studies, http://www.sieps.se/_pdf/Publikationer?CR20031.pdf, accessed 14.01.04
Regini, M. (2000) ‘Between deregulation and social pacts: the responses of European economies to globalization’, Politics and Society, 28 (1), 5-33.
Rhodes, M. (1998) ‘Globalization, labour markets and welfare states: a future of “competitive corporatism”?’, in M. Rhodes and Y. Meny, eds, The Future of European Welfare: a New Social Contract? Basingstoke: Macmillan, 178-20.
Ruigrok, W. and van Tulder, R. (1996) ‘the price of diversity: rival concepts of control as a barrier to an EU industrial strategy’, in P. Devine, Y. Katsoulacos, and R. Sugden, eds, Competitiveness, Subsidiarity, and Industrial Policy, London: Routledge, 79-103.
Sbragia, A. (2000) ‘The European Union as coxswain: governance by steering’, in J. Pierre, ed., Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 219-240.
Scharpf, F.W. (2002) ‘The European Social Model’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 (4), 645-670.
Scharpf, F.W. and Schmidt, V. (2000a) Welfare and Work in the Open Economy. Vol I. From Vulnerability to Competitiveness, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Scharpf, F.W. and Schmidt, V. (2000b) Welfare and Work in the Open Economy. Vol II. Common Challenges and Diverse Responses, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Scott, J. and Trubek, D.M. (2002) ‘Mind the gap: law and new approaches to governance in the European Union’, European Law Journal, 8 (1), 1-18.
Shonfield, A. (1965) Modern Capitalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stella, D. (2000) ‘Globalization, think tanks and policy transfer’, in D. Stone, ed., Banking on Knowledge: the Genesis of the Global Development Network, London: Routledge, 203-220.
Streeck, W. (1995) ‘From market making to state building? Reflections on the political economy of European social policy’, in S. Leibfried and P. Pierson, eds, European Social Policy: between Fragmentation and Integration, Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 389-431.
Telò, M. (2002) ‘Governance and government in the European Union: the Open Method of Coordination’, in M.J. Rodrigues, ed., The New Knowledge Economy in Europe, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 242-272.
Tömmel, I. (1994) ‘Interessenartikulation und transnationale Politikkooperation im Rahmen der EU’, in V. Eichener and H. Voelkoz, eds, Europäische Integration und verbändliche Regulierung, Marburg: Metropolis.
Tömmel, I. (1998) ‘Transformation of governance: the European Commission’s strategy for creating a “Europe of the Regions”‘, Regional and Federal Studies, 8 (2), 52-80.
UW-Madison EU Centre of Excellence (2006) OMC Research Forum, http://eucenter.wisc.edu/OMC/open12.html, last accessed 10.02.2006
Van Apeldoorn, B. (2002) Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration, London: Routledge.
Van der Pijl, K. (1984) The Making of the Atlantic Ruling Class, London: New Left Books.
Vobruba, G. (1995) ‘Social policy on tomorrow’s Euro-Corporatist stage’, Journal of European Social Policy, 5(4), 303-315.
Wallace, H. (2000) ‘The institutional setting: five variations on a theme’, in H. Wallace and W. Wallace, eds., Policy-making in the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3-37.
Walker, N. (2000) ‘Flexibility within a metaconstitutional frame: reflexions on the future of legal authority’, in G. de Búrca and J. Scott, eds. Constitutional Change in the EU: from Uniformity to Flexibility? Oxford: Hart, 9-30.
Willke, H. (1992) Ironie des Staates, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Willke, H. (1996) Supervision des Staates, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Zeitlin, J. (2005a) The Lisbon Strategy, the Open Method of Coordination, and the future of EU socio-economic governance, PowerPoint presentation.
Zeitlin, J. (2005b) ‘Conclusion: the Open Method of Coordination in Action: Theoretical Promise, Empirical Realities, reform strategy’, in idem and P. Pochet, with L. Magnusson, eds, The Open Method of Coordination in Action: the European Employment and Social Inclusion Strategies, Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang, 00-00.
Ziltener, P. (2001) Strukturwandel der europäischen Integration. Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot.